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Eskualdeen arteko desberdintasunek autonomia eskakizunak sor ditzake: eskualderik pobreenak
mendekotasunaren beldur dira, aberatsenek transferentziak egiteari uko egiten dioten bitartean. Baina
federalismoaren ezaugarri ekonomikoek diseinu arretatsua behar dute, diru sarrerak batzea sustatzeko
modukoa. Aurrekontu muga gogorrak begiratzean datza erronka, are Egonkortasun eta Hazkunderako
Egiunearen baitan ere. Entzute handikoak dira barne egonkortasunerako egiuneak; baina baliteke agin-
pide txiki askoren herrietan oinarrituagoak diren ikuspuntuak beharrezkoagoak izatea.
Giltza-Hitzak: Estatu azpiko erakundeak. Federalismo fiskala. Erregionalismoa. Egonkortasun
eta Hazkunderako Egiunea.
Las disparidades regional pueden ocasionar exigencias de autonomía: las regiones más pobres
temen la dominación mientras que las más ricas se resisten a las transferencias. Pero las caracterís-
ticas económicas del federalismo precisan un diseño cuidadoso, que promueva la convergencia de
ingresos. Un reto consiste en preservar duras limitaciones presupuestarias, incluso dentro del Pacto
de Estabilidad y Crecimiento. Los pactos internos de estabilidad son populares; pero puede que sean
necesarios enfoques más basados en el mercado en países con muchas pequeñas autoridades.  
Palabras Clave: Entidades sub-estatales. Federalismo fiscal. Regionalismo. Pacto de Esta bili -
dad y Crecimiento.
Les disparités régionale peuvent occasionner des exigences d’autonomie: les régions les plus pauv-
res craignent la domination cependant que les plus riches se refusent aux transferts. Mais les caractéris-
tiques économiques du fédéralisme ont besoin d’une soigneuse conception, qui encourage la conver-
gence de revenus. Un défi consiste à préserver de dures limites budgétaires, y compris dans le Pacte de
Stabilité et de Croissance. Les pactes internes de stabilité sont populaires; mais il se peut que des appro-
ches basées plus sur le marché dans des pays avec de nombreuses autorités soient nécessaires.
Mots Clé : Organismes sous-étatiques. Fédéralisme fiscal. Régionalisme. Pacte de Stabilité et
de Croissance.
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These presentations raise timely issues about the role of sub-state entities in
the EU, and possible implications for the new Member States. One question they
prompt concerns the challenge to policy-makers regarding economic develop-
ment in sub-state entities. What policy approaches promise to foster robust
growth and job creation, and accelerate convergence in less advanced areas?
This issue is crucial for the longer run health of sub-state entities – but it could
also be one of the keys to a new dynamism in the broader EU economy. Only with
a stronger performance in less advanced areas will the EU become a zone of
growth and high employment – rather than a chequer-board whose average
levels of income and employment are destined to remain disappointing.
The economic identity of sub-state entities is grounded in history, but must
be continually reinvented. Benedict Andersen taught us to think of nations as
“imaginary communities” and the same is true for sub-state entities. Moreover,
the economic vision that takes hold in these entities may influence strongly their
longer-run autonomy and viability. In recent EU experience, three elements can
help shed light on this: the economic influences on sub-state autonomy; the
nature of internal fiscal settlements in states; and policy approaches that foste-
red broadly based economic convergence within state economies. 
ECONOMIC INFLUENCES ON THE EMERGENCE OF SUB-STATE AUTONOMY
Together with purely political factors, a key economic influence on sub-state
autonomy emerges from recent EU experience: the unevenness of income and
employment across sub-state entities. This is a factor that will resonate in many
of the new Member States, which feature striking local variations in income and
employment. 
But the influence of such disparities on the emergence of policy autonomy at
the sub-state level is complex. A priori, the need to tackle inequality might seem
to argue against divisions below the state level, which might impede factor mobi-
lity. And certainly some unitary states with strong policies (Denmark, Ireland and
the Netherlands, for example) have seen their regional disparities decline subs-
tantially over recent decades in the context of robust growth and job creation in
the wider economy. But in countries where employment growth has been proble-
matic, regional imbalances have had the potential to exacerbate tensions, and
thus intensify pressures for greater sub-state autonomy. The experience of
Belgium and Italy, for example, is striking in this regard. 
In such cases of sustained regional imbalances, economic tensions can run
in two directions. Less advanced areas may see state policies as catering insuf-
ficiently for local needs – for instance, in terms of investment or training.
Symmetrically, more prosperous areas may resent the fiscal transfers implicit in
different tax yields and unemployment transfers. This latter reaction can be seen
clearly in prosperous areas such as Flanders or northern Italy in the 1980s and
1990s. Together with other factors, it contributed to pressures for greater sub-
state economic autonomy in those cases – and in Belgium the result was a
major change in economic roles. 
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In the new Member States, such underlying economic factors may prove as
important, over time, as policy-driven influences such as mechanisms for disbur-
sing EU structural funds. But pressures are one thing, and performance is another:
policy autonomy, to deliver growth and jobs in a stable economic setting, needs to
be carefully managed…
“FISCAL SETTLEMENTS” BETWEEN THE STATE AND ITS ENTITIES
A growing concern in the literature on sub-state autonomy has been the cha-
llenge of fiscal co-ordination. Among emerging market economies, the experien-
ce of Argentina and Indonesia – where expenditure control was undermined
during decentralization – has heightened awareness of this problem. If decentra-
lization ends up by jeopardizing economic stability, it risks killing the golden goo-
se of private sector confidence.
Such adverse experience is sometimes used to argue against decentraliza-
tion. But that pre-supposes decentralization to be an option. Its political-econo-
mic roots, however, may run deep – and if so, fiscal tensions could be as serious
in its absence. The case evidence is useful, rather, in illustrating the risks of
badly-designed decentralization. For success, it is crucial to address tensions ex
ante, through co-operative fiscal  settlements that define the rights and respon-
sibilities of the different levels of government. This can ensure adequate resour-
ces, but also hard budget constraints, for sub-state entities. 
For the “old” and new Member States of the EU, of course, fiscal co-ordina-
tion has a particular formal importance because of the goals embodied in the
Maastricht criteria for euro area entry and the Stability and Growth Pact. And
recent years have seen continuous experimentation with internal co-ordination in
some Member States.2 Three cases deserve mention, at least by way of illustra-
ting how some EU members have been wrestling with this issue. It is notable that
the two of these that are most decentralized – Belgium and Spain – have ended
up adopting formal or informal “internal stability pacts”.
• In Belgium, a series of negotiations over the past two decades achieved
the transition from a fiscally unitary to a fully federal state. The structure is
complex (in part because regions and language communities are distinct).
And the negotiations had to address deeply-rooted problems. But it is
notable that this period also saw a dramatic turnaround in the public finan-
ces, setting Belgium’s debt on a declining trend and clearing the way to
euro area membership. This was based on strong co-ordination of fiscal
goals between the levels of government, supported by the work of a speci-
fic body: the High Council of Finance.
2. Some countries, despite minor innovations, retained a quintessentially unitary structure. At
the other extreme, Germany was founded, of course, as a fully-fledged federal state – but even the-
re recent years have seen considerable debate about the effectiveness of its internal federal fiscal
arrangements.
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• Spain has wrestled with issues of fiscal decentralization, adopting over
time a variable geometry that reflects the imprint of history on its various
autonomous communities. Again, this challenge did not impede fiscal con-
solidation. But the authorities have now moved to a legally-based internal
pact enforcing budget balance at all levels of government: experience is
still being gained with the Ley de Estabilidad Presupuestaria that was
enacted at the beginning of this decade.
• The United Kingdom is generally regarded as a fiscally unitary state,
because a high share of revenues are gathered centrally and then redistri-
buted. The constitutional innovations of the past few years – giving diffe-
ring measures of autonomy to Scotland and Wales – nonetheless show
experimentation, and represent a learning experience that, again, is still
underway.   
Currently, as indicated by Elena Jurado, fiscal decentralization has not been
strongly catalyzed in the new Member States by the EU integration process –
 although it is somewhat more evident in Hungary and Poland than elsewhere.3 To
the extent decentralization does take root in these economies in due course, two
administrative issues are likely to come to the forefront. 
The first, along the lines discussed above, is indeed the priority of ensuring
firm control over public spending. The new Member States are grappling with
important challenges in supporting reforms, restructuring expenditures, and revi-
sing tax bases to reduce over-dependence on labour income. The far-reaching
nature of some reforms – for example, the privatization of local services – will
itself change the whole accountability landscape for local issues in the period
ahead. While managing these tasks over the next few years, policy-makers might
be well-advised to contemplate the added dimension of further decentralization
only if this is politically essential; and, if so, then to adopt approaches that gua-
rantee hard budget constraints. Otherwise there may be risks of crowding out pri-
vate sector development – and thus damaging the motor of real convergence.
The second issue concerns the philosophy of fiscal discipline. In principle
there are two “corner solutions:” internal stability pacts, or market-based sys-
tems under which local authorities face rating disciplines and risks of bankruptcy.
Thus far, EU experience in has been essentially in the former direction (as cited
above). But this probably presupposes a modest number of major regions, with
whom negotiations can tractably be held – a situation which does not currently
prevail in all the new Member States. This is a complicating factor that needs to
be weighed carefully in their situation. On the other hand, if stability pacts are
adopted, these should allow fiscal stabilizers to work, which implies avoiding sim-
ple balanced-budget rules that could force tax increases or spending cuts in a
recession – an unfortunate feature in some such existing internal arrangements.
3. It is also possible that the Copenhagen emphasis on non-discrimination against minorities
may have helped counter some factors that could otherwise have led to early calls for greater policy
autonomy.
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ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHIES AFFECTING THE SUB-STATE LEVEL
Examining cases of decentralization across the EU, a wide range of econo-
mic issues can be found assigned at the sub-state level – ranging from property
taxation to aspects of foreign economic relations. Nonetheless, when once con-
siders key policy influences on growth and employment, some are not found at
this level. Belgium – strongly federal by any standards – nonetheless has social
security policies as a state (central) function, and the design of these policies
clearly influences incentives in the labour market. So it is helpful to consider first,
irrespective of administrative level, what policy approaches may be friendly to
economic growth and convergence. This will provide a basis to reflect on possi-
ble policy approaches at the sub-state level – but also on the kind of feedback
these entities may need to deliver to state or EU levels as regards wider policy
approaches.
A classic contrast in convergence experience (internal and external) has
been noted by many commentators in Ireland and Italy. A degree of consensus
has emerged that Ireland was more successful because it placed much stronger
emphasis than Italy on avoiding subsidies to declining industries, on ensuring
bureaucratic transparency in decision-making throughout the territory, on facili-
tating inward direct investment, on fostering high standards of education, and on
fostering a fairly flexible labour market – all this in a setting of macroeconomic
policies that strongly turned around private sector confidence. 
No doubt reflecting these factors, Ireland has experienced very rapid internal
and external convergence over the past two decades. In Italy, growth and
employment performance lagged across the economy on average, and one key
reason lay in the poor progress that was made in fostering catch-up in the mez-
zogiorno. This comparison may be of particular interest for the new EU Member
States, because regional aid from the EU in both these cases has been generous
– but associated with very differing degrees of success. 
In Ireland and Italy, most of the policy domains cited above were in fact at
the level of the state. But another valuable example is to contrast within the sta-
te of Belgium the policies toward structural change adopted from the 1970s at
the sub-state level in Flanders and Wallonia. Flanders’ economic take-off since
that time reflected, no doubt, many influences – including an economic structu-
re at the time of the oil shocks that featured less energy-intensive sectors.
Wallonia, by contrast, languished: unemployment remained very high. Among
the key factors underlying this contrast appear to have been differing attitudes to
support for declining industries, and poor responsiveness of local labour market
conditions, including wages, to employment trends. Important also is that a fun-
damental dilemma emerged in Belgium: under fiscal autonomy, but with weak
structural policies, less advanced areas now have less resources avail for training
or infrastructure investment… Fiscal autonomy without structural economic
reforms can be a recipe for divergence among sub-state entities.
Is the experience of southern Italy or Belgium unrepresentative of sub-state
development in the EU economy? Unfortunately not. Germany, too, has expe-
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rienced major difficulties in fostering regional convergence – and this is true in a
minor key in the western Länder, not just the east. Experience in Spain has been
mixed. As a broad generalization, the literature suggests that regional conver-
gence in western Europe was rapid in the 1950s and 1960s, but slowed – and
in some cases stalled – from the mid-1970s onwards. Given the lower income
levels, and wide disparities, in the new Member States, it would be dramatic if
they now found their internal convergence similarly arrested.
To the extent this is true, then sub-state authorities – where policy-makers
are most directly faced by the tensions of weakly performing areas – are likely to
focus strongly on this issue in the period ahead. At their own level, they can fos-
ter training and economic renewal, rather than perpetuate declining industries –
where they have the instruments to do this. But they may well be led also to seek
policy reform at the state and EU levels: to urge approaches that would help fos-
ter strong convergence within and among Member States. The experience of
Italy and Ireland, cited above, is strongly suggestive about the direction of requi-
red structural reforms – which would need to be market-friendly, outward-loo-
king, and couched in a setting of credible macroeconomic policies.
CONCLUSION
In sum, fundamental economic choices lie ahead in the enlarged EU, inclu-
ding notably its new Member States – and such choices could be influenced by
crucially by sub-state entities… 
A pessimist might imagine backward areas within the member states sliding
toward a culture of dependency – lobbying their governments, and Brussels
directly, for subsidies to cushion the costs of disadvantage. Enlargement and
enhanced competition would become engines of discontent. Social protection,
on this model, might be devoted to minimizing wage differentials and ensuring
high replacement rates for benefits. Hours would be shortened. And immigration
within and from outside the EU – like part-time or temporary employment – might
be seen mainly as threatening a fixed lump of jobs. But with enlargement, and
with potentially dynamic economic relations with the EU’s new eastern neigh-
bours, the scope for more benign outcomes is clear. Indeed, the wide income
disparities of the enlarged EU make it politically essentially to find ways of tap-
ping this potential for strong growth and job creation.
Sub-state entities, if they are vocal, can help in spearheading this process.
But to do so effectively they must be prepared to revitalize their economic struc-
tures, and think in terms of a variable geometry of economic identity. Sub-state
entities may develop close links across the borders of new Europe – linking are-
as not only in Sweden and Finland, for example, but in Germany and the Czech
Republic, or Italy and Croatia. 
By guaranteeing free cross-border movement of goods (and, one day, of
labour), the EU enhances these possibilities. Moreover, the freedom of capital
movements within the EU can allow sub-state entities to specialize more strongly
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– because they can moderate the income risks of households through invest-
ment in other areas. In the United States, the strength of local specialization is
doubtless linked to the fact that states diversify some two-fifths of their GDP
shocks through the income they earn on out-of-state assets. 
So the vision would be of outward-looking sub-state entities, welcoming the
movement of capital and labour. To realize it requires, very clearly, much faster
structural reform in the EU, along the lines of the Lisbon agenda… But, as dis-
cussed above, it also requires co-operation and policy learning among the EU,
state, and sub-state levels about the structures and changes needed for growth,
and the way autonomy plays into this nexus. 
Such a vision holds the potential, of course, for rapid convergence of less
advanced areas within the EU. But for the wider geographic Europe, too, it pro-
mises a dynamic future.
